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THIRD-PARTY RELIEF FOR MUNICIPAL DEBTORS:
“NECESSITY” IN THE CHAPTER 9 CONTEXT
ABSTRACT
“Third-party releases” are a longstanding—although non-statutory—form
of relief in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. Bankruptcy courts use them to relieve
non-debtors of liability for certain debts. For example, directors of a debtor
corporation might propose to contribute assets to a settlement fund in exchange
for tort plaintiffs giving up their claims against the directors. Although circuits
are currently split on whether to allow third-party relief at all, the majority
agree that it falls within bankruptcy courts’ § 105(a) equitable authority in
certain circumstances. Courts make this determination using a variety of tests,
most notably the “Dow Corning factors.”
With the recent uptick in municipal bankruptcy cases, some debtors have
attempted to extend third-party relief to chapter 9 bankruptcy. These cases fall
roughly into two categories. In the first, a state provides funds to assist in a
reorganization in return for certain creditors giving up claims against the state.
In the second, a city attempts to relieve its police officers of liability for civil
rights violations by including injunctions against the plaintiffs in the city’s plan
of reorganization. If the officers themselves had filed for bankruptcy, these
lawsuits would be nondischargeable claims arising from personal physical
injury under § 523(a)(6). While courts have so far applied the Dow Corning
factors correctly to the first category of cases, a series of decisions in the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits have led to a much more lenient standard (the “necessity
standard”) for the second.
This Comment argues that the second series of decisions has ignored
fundamental limitations on the permissibility of third-party relief. First, courts
should not allow it to be used as a loophole for discharging otherwise nondischargeable debts. Second, by removing substantive limitations on third-party
relief the necessity standard both ignores the limits of a bankruptcy court’s
equitable powers and incentivizes over-reliance by municipalities. This
Comment advocates discarding the necessity standard and returning to
established standards that limit third-party relief to situations in which it is
consistent with the Code.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2016, Korey King, a San Bernardino, CA resident, filed suit
against three city police officers.1 In his complaint, King alleged that the officers
had violated his civil rights, and King requested damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.2 He did not include the city as a defendant.3 However, King soon
received notice that his suit had been stayed pending the resolution of San
Bernardino’s chapter 9 bankruptcy case.4 The confirmation of the city’s plan of
reorganization several months later brought even worse news.5 Because San
Bernardino had undertaken the officers’ defense in King’s case, California law
obligated the city to indemnify them for any damages awarded.6
San Bernardino, accordingly, had proposed in its plan of reorganization to
enjoin King and numerous other civil rights plaintiffs from collecting damages
on their claims against indemnified police officers.7 The city claimed that this
injunction—referred to as a “third-party release”—was necessary to free up
funds for its continued operations, including a $56.5 million “Police Resources
Plan” targeting the city’s high crime rates.8 The bankruptcy court agreed with
San Bernardino and approved its plan of reorganization.9 In October 2017 the
district court affirmed that King’s suit was subject to the plan injunction.10
King’s right to receive compensation was effectively erased by the bankruptcy
of a city that was not a party to his suit.
Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code applies to municipalities.11
While municipal bankruptcies have historically been rare,12 the recent recession

1

King v. San Bernardino Police Officers, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102424 *1 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
3
King, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102424, at *1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. 46, 49–50 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2017). See CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 825 (Deering 2018); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825.2(b) (Deering 2018).
7
King, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102424, at *1.
8
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 61.
9
Id. at 63.
10
King, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102424, at *14.
11
11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012). A municipality is a “political subdivision or public agency or
instrumentality of a State.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012). This includes cities, towns, villages, boroughs,
townships, incorporated authorities, and commissions. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 109.04[3][a][i]–[ii] (Alan
N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010).
12
John Patrick Hunt, Taxes and Ability to Pay in Municipal Bankruptcy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 515, 516
(2016) (citing Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role of State Choices, 37
CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 72 (2015)).
2
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prompted several major cities,13 a county,14 and a host of other entities to seek
relief under chapter 9.15 Many of these financially troubled municipalities
entered bankruptcy bearing obligations to indemnify their employees against
personal liability for acts committed in their professional capacities.16 Chapter 9
generally gives debtors great flexibility to modify their obligations in tailoring
plans of reorganization, without balancing the interests of creditors.17
Accordingly, several of these municipalities, including San Bernardino, sought
to extend the Code’s protections to their indemnified employees.18
A bankruptcy court’s ability to release non-debtor parties from debts is a
powerful but infrequently-invoked measure.19 Debtors may offer what this
Comment will refer to as “third-party relief” to creditors in exchange for
continued financing or consent to less-favorable terms,20 or to their own officers
who play an important role in reorganization.21 Circuits are currently split on
whether this relief is permissible under chapter 11, with the majority allowing it
in certain unusual circumstances.22 The seven Dow Corning factors form the
13
See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 277 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re City of San
Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 48; In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 783 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (June 28, 2012);
In re City of Vallejo, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4433, at *53 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2008).
14
In re Jefferson County, 491 B.R. 277, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2013).
15
See Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Divide: Federalism Concerns in Municipal Insolvency, 11
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 34 (2017) (noting the “recent municipal insolvency crisis” involving “an
unprecedented number of municipal bankruptcy filings”); Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map,
GOVERNING (Sep. 14, 2017), http://www.governing.com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-anddefaults.html (noting that 61 municipalities have filed for bankruptcy since 2010).
16
See, e.g., In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 54 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a), obligating a
public entity “to indemnify its employees for judgments against the employees based upon employee acts or
omissions arising within the scope of employment”).
17
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010).
18
See In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 48–49 (seeking an injunction preventing civil rights
plaintiffs from collecting on judgments against city police officers); In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 262–63
(seeking to discharge civil rights claims against city police officers).
19
See generally 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1141.02[5][c] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2010). (“Nonconsensual Release of Third Parties”).
20
Deryck A. Palmer et al., Third Party Releases Survive Supreme Court’s Decision in Travelers
Indemnity Co. v. Bailey, 5 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 554, 555, 562 (2009) (“[R]eleases of claims against officers,
directors or other employees may be critical to a debtor’s successful continuation of business after confirmation
of its plan.”). See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that “reorganization hinge[d] on the debtor being free from … suits against parties who would have
indemnity … claims”).
21
Palmer et al., supra note 20. See, e.g., Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow
Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2001) (approving plan enjoining claims against debtor’s shareholders
and insurers).
22
See, e.g., In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 52 (noting the circuit split); Resorts Int’l v.
Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the specific rule in 11
U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) “displace[d]” the bankruptcy courts’ general “equitable powers” granted by 11 U.S.C.
§ 105 (2012), and listing Ninth Circuit precedent); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58 (holding that
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most notable standard.23 The Ninth Circuit, which has adopted the minority
position, has also indicated that its prohibition of third-party relief in chapter 11
bankruptcy will not extend to chapter 9 cases.24
In the recent wave of municipal bankruptcies, several cities unable to
indemnify law enforcement officers for civil rights lawsuits instead sought thirdparty relief in the form of injunctions against the plaintiffs.25 Drawing from
chapter 11 case law, courts in these cases have converged on a standard basing
the availability of third-party relief on its “necessity” to reorganization.26 As a
result, municipal debtors now enjoy a great degree of freedom to modify their
employees’ obligations to third parties. These decisions, however, have not
addressed two important considerations that should limit the availability of
third-party relief.
First, bankruptcy courts have failed to consider whether they possess the
authority to release third parties from debts that would be nondischargeable in
the third-party’s own bankruptcies. These include debts listed under § 523(a) as
“exceptions to discharge,” such as those arising from “fraud . . . embezzlement,
or larceny,” “domestic support obligations,” “willful or malicious injury” to
another’s person, or for benefits obtained under “false pretenses.”27 The § 523(a)
exceptions reflect a Congressional policy of “not allowing a debtor to use the
bankruptcy system to avoid debts when the debtor acted wrongfully in incurring
those debts.”28
Second, courts have not justified the introduction of a new, necessity-based,
standard for chapter 9. The constitutional status of municipalities precludes

11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) only limits the scope of the debtor’s discharge, not a court’s authority to issue
injunctions affecting third parties under 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012)).
23
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58.
24
Deocampo v. Potts, 836 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that its reasoning in In re
Lowenschuss precluding third-party relief in chapter 11 “does not apply in Chapter 9 proceedings”).
25
See V.W. v. City of Vallejo, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145 at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (“This civil rights
lawsuit . . . against the City of Vallejo . . . and its Chief of Police . . . alleges that the City’s police officers killed
the decedent while they were using a taser gun during his arrest.”); Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1137 (“Plaintiffs
asserted excessive-force and other constitutional claims against the Officers.”); In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R.
at 263 (“[The plaintiffs’] lawsuits allege . . .officers’ various violations of their constitutional rights”); In re City
of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50 (“[Plaintiffs] alleged the officers had violated their civil rights”).
26
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67 (applying a test from In re Dow Corning Corp. to hold that
Detroit must show the “necessity” of third-party relief “to … the success of the plan”).
27
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), (5), (6) (2012).
28
Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, With Malice Toward One–Defining Nondischargeability of Debts for Willful
and Malicious Injury Under § 523(A)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 151, 151 (2016).
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“failure” in the chapter 11 sense, removing any objective measure of necessity.29
Furthermore, the ubiquity of indemnification obligations will lead most
municipal debtors to request, and qualify for, third-party relief, destroying its
status as a dramatic measure reserved for unusual circumstances.30 This will
invite abuse by allowing municipal officials to regularly avoid debts they could
not discharge individually, extending municipal bankruptcy beyond the bounds
contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.
This Comment begins by outlining the structure and goals of chapter 9
bankruptcy, as well as several state-law alternatives available to municipalities.
Next, it discusses the prevalence of municipal indemnification obligations and
the circumstances which give rise to these obligations. This Comment then
provides an overview of the case law governing third party relief in chapter 11,
which courts have imported into chapter 9 cases. It continues by examining in
detail the use of third-party relief to shield police officers from liability for civil
rights violations in recent chapter 9 cases.
This Comment establishes that the § 523(a) exceptions to discharge overrule
bankruptcy’s general policy of giving the debtor a “fresh start,” which is also the
justification for third-party relief. Next, it argues that the necessity standard is
not appropriate for chapter 9 because it removes crucial limiting factors from
Dow Corning, and because a municipality’s indissolubility precludes an
objective measure of necessity. Combined with the ubiquity of municipal
indemnification obligations, these omissions leave a municipal debtor with
almost no substantive limitations on the availability of third-party relief.
Finally, this Comment examines the Dow Corning factors’ suitability for
municipal bankruptcy and conclude that they reflect basic Code requirements
equally applicable to chapters 11 and 9. Because so little precedent exists, courts
can easily resume restricting third-party relief to truly unusual circumstances.
This Comment also notes possible legislative solutions. For instance, Congress
could expand the scope of chapter 9 if it decides that protecting public
employees is crucial to successful reorganization. States could also amend their

29
See In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (quoting
“[N]either Congress nor the courts can change the existing system of government in this country . . . . One of
the powers reserved to the states is the power to create and govern municipalities.”); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 900.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld
municipal debt adjustment legislation . . . at least in part on the premise that the legislation involves no possibility
of . . . liquidation of [a municipality’s] assets.”).
30
For instance, a recent study found that “police officers are virtually always indemnified.” Joanna C.
Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 885 (2014).
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indemnification laws to directly protect employees of financially-troubled
municipalities.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Chapter 9 Bankruptcy and Municipal Alternatives
Chapter 9 bankruptcy “permit[s] a financially distressed public entity to seek
protection from its creditors.”31 It is primarily in this context that the necessity
standard and the possibility of releasing third parties from nondischargeable
debts arises. However, financially distressed municipalities have additional nonbankruptcy options, so this section will place chapter 9 in the context of state
solutions, such as receiverships.
1. Overview of Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
In contrast to the other Code chapters, chapter 9 provides “systematic
advantages for debtor municipalities,”32 such as limited control by the
bankruptcy court,33 little consideration of creditors’ interests,34 and the debtor
municipality’s exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.35 These
advantages are consequently reserved for a very narrow class of entities:
insolvent municipalities that states have “specifically authorized” to be
debtors.36 Currently, twenty-seven states authorize at least some municipalities

31

6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010).
Heith M. Frost, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalism, Specific Authorization, and
Protection of Municipal Economic Health, 84 MISS. L.J. 817, 820 (2015). See also Elizabeth M. Watkins, In
Defense of the Chapter 9 Option: Exploring the Promise of a Municipal Bankruptcy as a Mechanism for
Structural Political Reform, 39 J. LEGIS. 89, 93 (2013) (characterizing the benefits of chapter 9 bankruptcy as
“similar to those offered . . . under Chapter 11, but more extensive”).
33
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2][c] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010)
(quoting In re Willacy County Water Control & Improvement District No. 1, 36 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D. Tex.
1940)); 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (“[U]nless the debtor consents or the plan so provides, the court may not . . .
interfere with–(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property of revenues
of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.”).
34
Christopher J. Tyson, Exploring the Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661,
678 (2014).
35
11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012) (“The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the debtor’s debts . . . with
the petition [or] at such later time as the court fixes.”).
36
11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title . . . only if such
entity . . . is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor . . . by State law”).
32
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to be debtors.37 Because of the specific authorization requirement, states lacking
such laws prohibit municipalities from becoming debtors by default.38
Many of chapter 9’s unique characteristics stem from Tenth Amendment
federalism considerations, which prevent bankruptcy courts from interfering
with or usurping state sovereignty.39 The approval requirement, noted above,
avoids this problem by allowing states to “[invite] the intervention of the
bankruptcy power.”40 A chapter 9 case starts when an insolvent municipality
files a petition for relief with the bankruptcy court.41 In chapter 9, “insolvent”
means that the debtor is “generally not paying” or “unable to pay” its debts as
they become due.42 While the case is pending, the debtor may continue its
operations and incur new debts, subject to limited court oversight.43 After the
municipality has proposed a plan of reorganization, the bankruptcy court largely
resigns to approving its plan of reorganization or dismissing the case.44
Tenth Amendment considerations also give rise to important conceptual
differences between chapter 9 and chapter 11 bankruptcy. Because only states

37
CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS? HOW STATES AND INVESTORS DEAL WITH
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES app. B (2012), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/files/2013/12/chapmanandcutlerchapter9.pdf. See also Tom D. Hoffman, Note, Municipal Bankruptcy
Authorization Under Chapter 9: A Call for Uniformity Among States, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 215, 223–
25 (2014) (outlining state policies regarding municipal bankruptcy).
38
CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, supra note 37.
39
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2][c] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010)
(noting the “severe” limitations placed upon bankruptcy courts by the Tenth Amendment and related Supreme
Court cases.). See generally Colin McGrath, Municipal Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federalism, 18 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1265, 1283–96 (2016) (explaining chapter 9 restrictions in light of Tenth Amendment doctrines of
commandeering, coercion, and comity).
40
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938). See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (“An entity may be a
debtor under chapter 9 of this title . . . only if such entity . . . is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor . . . by
State law”).
41
11 U.S.C. § 921 (2012); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 921.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2010).
42
11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2012). See also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02[2][c] (Alan N. Resnick
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010).
43
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2][b]–[c] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2010).
44
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010)
(“If the case is not successful, or if the plan cannot be implemented as confirmed, the court’s remedy is limited
to dismissal of the case pursuant to section 930.”); In re Willacy County Water Control & Improv. Dist., 36 F.
Supp. at 38–39 (“The court is merely authorized to determine insolvency, or inability to meet debts as they
mature, and whether the plan proposed is in accordance with the provisions of the statute [and the criteria for
plan approval].”).
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can create or dissolve municipalities,45 chapter 9 has no analog to the
“conversion” of a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for liquidation.46 Without a
liquidation option, the confirmation requirement that a plan be in the “best
interests of the creditors” simply requires it to provide a better alternative to
creditors than individual recovery efforts outside of bankruptcy.47
As in cases brought under other chapters of the Code, a bankruptcy court in
a chapter 9 case has “broad [equitable] authority to modify creditor-debtor
relationships.”48 Section 105(a) in particular authorizes courts to “issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title.”49 The “Grand Bargain” reached in Detroit’s bankruptcy
case between the city, pension plan claimants and trustees, the Detroit Institute
of Arts, and the state of Michigan provides an excellent example of the
bankruptcy court’s ability to implement creative solutions that balance
competing interests.50 However, as the Third Circuit has pointed out, § 105(a)
“does not create substantive rights that would otherwise be unavailable under
the Bankruptcy Code.”51 For example, a court’s equitable authority is limited by
the confirmation requirement that a plan of reorganization must comply with all
applicable Code provisions.52 Chapter 9’s confirmation requirements also
include § 943(b)(4) and (6), which dictate that a plan of reorganization cannot
require actions that violate applicable state or nonbankruptcy federal law.53

45
See In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 649 (quoting “[N]either Congress nor the
courts can change the existing system of government in this country . . . . One of the powers reserved to the
states is the power to create and govern municipalities.”).
46
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld municipal debt adjustment legislation … at least in part on the premise that
the legislation involves no possibility of . . . liquidation of [a municipality’s] assets.”); In re Richmond Unified
School Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (1991) (“A municipal unit cannot liquidate its assets to satisfy its creditors . . . .
Therefore, the primary purpose of Chapter 9 is to allow [it] to continue operating while it adjusts or refinances
its creditor[s’] claims”).
47
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[7][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010);
11 U.S.C. § 943(7) (2018). On municipal creditors’ remedies outside of bankruptcy, see C. Scott Pryor,
Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is Doing Best, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 85, 122–23 (2014).
48
United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990).
49
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018).
50
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 169–70. See generally Maureen B. Collins, Pensions or Paintings:
The Detroit Institute of Arts from Bankruptcy to Grand Bargain, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2015) (providing
an overview of the Detroit Institute of Arts’ role in the Grand Bargain).
51
Gillman v. Continental Airlines (In re Continental Airlines), 203 F.3 203, 211 (3rd Cir. 2000).
52
11 U.S.C. § 943(a)–(b) (2012).
53
11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4), (6) (2018). See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 943.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry
J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010).
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Several Code provisions outside of chapter 9 are also relevant to an analysis
of third-party relief in chapter 9 cases. The most relevant of these is § 524(e),54
which some circuits have held limits a court’s authority to grant relief to nondebtors.55 Section 524(e) disclaims any effect on other parties’ liabilities from
the discharge of a debtor’s obligation.56 The majority of circuits have interpreted
this provision narrowly to restrict only the effects of the discharge of any
particular debt, not the bankruptcy court’s ability to modify other parties’
obligations.57 For example, discharging an individual’s debt would not affect a
guarantor’s liability on that debt. However, § 524(e) would not prevent the court
from separately releasing the guarantor from liability.
Chapter 9 also does not incorporate § 523(a), entitled “exceptions to
discharge.”58 Section 523(a) states, in part, that “[a] discharge under [this title]
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . for willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
entity[.]”59 Other excepted debts include those “for fraud or defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny; . . . for a domestic
support obligation;” or “for death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s
operation of a motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft if such operation was unlawful
because the debtor was intoxicated.”60 Despite the general bankruptcy policy
favoring dischargeability of debts,61 this section reflects a congressional policy
of “not allowing a debtor to use the bankruptcy system to avoid debts when the

54
11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) (“[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other
entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.”); 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating
provisions of other Code chapters).
55
See In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 (holding that the specific rule in 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012)
“displace[d]” the bankruptcy courts’ general “equitable powers” granted by 11 U.S.C. § 105 and listing
consistent Ninth Circuit precedent).
56
11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) (“[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other
entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt”); 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (incorporating provisions
of other Code chapters).
57
Compare In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) only
limits the scope of the debtor’s discharge, not a court’s equitable authority to issue injunctions affecting third
parties under 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012)), with In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 (holding that the specific rule
in 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) “displace[d]” the bankruptcy courts’ general “equitable powers” granted by 11
U.S.C. § 105 (2012), and listing consistent Ninth Circuit precedent).
58
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012) (applicable to chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13).
59
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012). See also V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *6–7 (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) (2012) and its application in Gee v. Hammond (In re Gee), 173 B.R. 189, 193 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)
and other cases).
60
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)–(5), (9) (2018).
61
See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (referring to the “general policy of discharge” in the interest
of providing debtors a “fresh start”).
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debtor acted wrongfully in incurring those debts.”62 The Supreme Court even
held in Archer v. Warner that pre-petition settlements releasing the debtor from
liability in suits that would have given rise to non-dischargeable debts fall under
the scope of § 523(a).63 According to Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous
court in Grogan v. Garner, “Congress evidently concluded that the creditors’
interest in recovering full payment of debts in these categories outweighed the
debtors’ interest in a complete fresh start.”64
2. Alternatives to Chapter 9
A financially distressed municipality’s unsecured creditors generally have
few options for repayment outside of bankruptcy.65 Because a municipality’s
“principal asset . . . is its taxing power,” as the Supreme Court once noted, a
“municipal security is merely a draft on [its] good faith in exercising” that
power.66 States also generally prohibit the procurement of judicial liens on
public property.67 A creditor may have the right to petition for a writ of
mandamus “to compel the levying of authorized taxes” in the event of default,68
but in practice this is merely “an empty right to litigate.”69 For example, the
city’s experts in In re Detroit estimated that, ignoring the difficulty in obtaining
the necessary voter approval, raising taxes would simply precipitate the erosion
of the city’s tax base.70 The experts predicted that these effects would cancel
each other out, producing no net revenue gains with which to pay creditors.71
Most states provide an alternative to bankruptcy for financially-troubled
municipalities in the form of receiverships.72 Once state officials determine that
a municipality’s situation is sufficiently dire, they may appoint a receiver to take

62

Radwan, supra note 28.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.33 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) (citing
Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 323 (2003)) (holding that although a “settlement agreement and releases may
have worked a kind of novation, . . . that fact does not bar [the creditor] from showing that the settlement debt
arose out of false pretences, a false representation, or actual fraud, and consequently is nondischargeable”).
64
Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287.
65
Pryor, supra note 47.
66
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Ashbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 509–10 (1942).
67
See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 213 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6021(1) (2012));
Parker v. Klochko Equipment Rental Co., 590 F.2d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting the “well-understood and
established” principle “that it is contrary to public policy to allow private liens on public property”).
68
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 213 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6093(1) (2012)).
69
Id. at 215 (citing Faitoute Iron & Steel Co., 316 U.S. at 510).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Lyle Kossis, Note, Examining the Conflict Between Municipal Receivership and Local Autonomy, 98
VA. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2012).
63
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over its operations until the municipality is adequately rehabilitated.73 The
receiver has largely unrestricted power during this period to modify a
municipality’s obligations, fire employees, and sell its property.74 A defaulting
municipality’s secured creditors, including bondholders, may alternatively be
permitted to obtain a court-appointed receiver, who will attempt to raise
sufficient revenue to repay its debts.75 Authors have criticized municipal
receivership for allowing drastic measures and undermining local selfgovernance, and courts have acknowledged that chapter 9 bankruptcy may be
more desirable for creditors and municipalities alike.76
B. Municipal Indemnification Obligations
The literature regarding municipal obligations to indemnify employees
centers around police officers liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights
violations.77 Section 1983 subjects an official acting “under color of” state
authority to civil liability for violating any person’s Constitutional “rights,
privileges, or immunities.”78 Section 1983 advances the twin goals of
compensation and deterrence.79 Because the doctrine of sovereign immunity
does not generally protect municipalities unless they are acting as “arms of the
state,” they may also be subject to suit under § 1983.80
The counterpoising doctrine of qualified immunity comes into play as well,
shielding “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

73

Kossis, supra note 72.
Id.
75
See, e.g., In re Pleasant View Utility Dist., 24 B.R. 632, 637 n.4 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (citing
TENN. CODE § 7-82-505 providing municipal bondholders with statutory liens and prescribing receivership in
case of default).
76
Kossis, supra note 72; In re Pleasant View Utility Dist., 24 B.R. at 637 n.4 (citing In re North & South
Shenango Joint Muni. Auth., 14 B.R. 414, 421 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) on the inferiority of creditor-initiated
receiverships to chapter 9 bankruptcy).
77
See generally Schwartz, supra note 30 (providing a doctrinal overview of police indemnification and
an empirical study of its prevalence); Martin A. Schwartz, Should Juries be Informed That Municipality Will
Indemnify Officer’s § 1983 Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing?, 866 IOWA L. REV. 1209 (2001).
78
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
79
Schwartz, supra note 30 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 727 (1999)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“like other tort causes of action, it is designed to provide compensation for injuries
arising from the violation of legal duties, and thereby, of course, to deter future violations.”)).
80
Northern Ins. Co. v. Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (“refus[ing] to extend sovereign
immunity to counties” because “only States and arms of the State possess immunity from suits authorized by
federal law”).
74
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have known.”81 As an “immunity to suit,” the doctrine “ensure[s] that
‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials [will] be resolved prior to
discovery.”82 Thus, § 1983 claims resulting in damage awards have likely
survived assertions of qualified immunity.83
The deterrence prong of § 1983 assumes that imposing monetary penalties
will dissuade officials from violating civil rights.84 Indemnification dampens
this effect by using public funds to pay damage awards, ensuring that the
employees themselves will not suffer financial loss. However, proponents argue
that without indemnification the specter of liability will make officers hesitant
to “zealously enforce” the law, even with the partial shield of qualified
immunity.85 Because officers often lack the means to satisfy judgments against
them, indemnification also advances § 1983’s compensatory goal.86 To these
ends, many states and local governments have passed statutes and ordinances
obligating municipalities to defend or indemnify their employees against certain
lawsuits.87 Other municipalities may incur indemnification obligations by
entering into collective bargaining agreements with employee organizations,88

81
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(rejecting a rigid framework for applying qualified immunity and noting its role in balancing the “need to hold
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”).
82
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 231.
83
See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
3–4 (2015–2016) (describing recent “constitutional stagnation,” where many cases with the potential to develop
constitutional rights doctrines are instead dismissed due to qualified immunity); John C. Williams, Qualifying
Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2012) (positing that overly-protective application of
qualified immunity was responsible for the lack of First Amendment cases regarding Iraq war protests).
84
Schwartz, supra note 30, at 892 (citing City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“like
other tort causes of action, it is designed to provide compensation for injuries arising from the violation of legal
duties, and thereby, of course, to deter future violations.”)).
85
See id. at 887 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (“fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials] in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’”)); In
re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 55 (quoting Sinclair v. Arnebergh, 36 Cal. Rptr. 810, 813 (Cal. Ct. App.
1964) (justifying California’s police indemnification statute)).
86
Schwartz, supra note 30, at 952 (explaining why plaintiffs have often urged indemnification, even
dropping requests for punitive damages in return).
87
See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 905–06 n.93, 94 (providing examples of state and local indemnification
laws in Ohio, Arizona, Texas, and Missouri); In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50 (discussing Cal.
Government Code § 825, requiring municipalities to “indemnify their employees for claims against them arising
from the scope of their employment”).
88
See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67 (“[t]he City’s assumption of its contractual
indemnity obligations will result in the City’s full payment of valid § 1983 claims against employees in their
individual capacity”); In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 51 (noting that, although already obligated by
state law, “[t]he settlements the City negotiated with its employee unions and the operative collective bargaining
agreements required the City to reaffirm its obligation to indemnify the employees”).
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or decide whether to indemnify on a “case by case” basis.89 In fact, some have
argued that the system of municipal police indemnification is so widespread,90
and municipalities are sufficiently unresponsive to its expense,91 as to virtually
eliminate § 1983’s deterrent effect, thus functioning as a form of vicarious
liability.92
California’s indemnification statute is illustrative of state efforts to shield
public employees:
§ 825 (a) . . . [I]f an employee or former employee of a public entity
requests the public entity to defend him . . . against any claim or action
against him or her for an injury arising out of an act or omission
occurring within the scope of his or her employment as an employee
of the public entity . . . and the employee . . . reasonably cooperates in
good faith in the defense of the claim or action, [or if] the public entity
conducts the defense of an employee . . . against any claim or action
with his or her reasonable good-faith cooperation, the public entity
shall pay any judgment based thereon or any compromise or settlement
of the claim or action to which the public entity has agreed.93
[A] public entity is authorized to pay that part of a judgment that is for
punitive or exemplary damages if the governing body of that public
entity . . . finds all of the following:
(1) The judgment is based on an act or omission of an employee
. . . acting within the course and scope of his or her employment
as an employee of the public entity.
(2) At the time of the act giving rise to the liability, the
employee . . . acted, or failed to act, in good faith, without actual
malice and in the apparent best interests of the public entity.
(3) Payment of the claim or judgment would be in the best
interests of the public entity. 94
§ 825.2 (b) If the public entity did not conduct his defense against the
action or claim . . . an employee or former employee of a public entity
may recover from the public entity . . . only if he establishes that the
89

Schwartz, supra note 30, at 906 n.96.
See id. at 885 (revealing results of a nationwide study indicated that “police officers are virtually always
indemnified”).
91
Id. at 952 (arguing that “governments do not appear to be collecting enough information about lawsuits
to make educated decisions about whether or how to reduce the police activities that prompt these suits”).
92
Id. (quoting Bd. County. Comm’re v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 436 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“states’
indemnification statutes ‘mimic respondeat superior by authorizing indemnification of employees found liable
under § 1983 for actions within the scope of their employment.’”)).
93
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a) (2012).
94
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b).
90
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act or omission upon which the claim or judgment is based occurred
within the scope of his employment as an employee of the public entity
and the public entity fails to establish that he acted or failed to act
because of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice or that he willfully
failed or refused to conduct the defense of the claim or action in good
faith[.]95

The statute requires a municipality that undertakes the defense of a current or
former employee in a suit arising from the employee’s scope of duty to pay any
judgment or settlement amount reached therein.96 If the municipality does not
defend the employee, it must still pay any judgment or settlement unless the
employee acted “because of fraud, corruption, or actual malice” or failed to
“conduct the defense in good faith.”97 The statute also permits, but does not
mandate, municipal payment of punitive or exemplary damages in certain
circumstances.98
Despite the widespread protection of public employees, this author has not
found any opinion deciding whether municipal indemnification obligations
(contractual or statutory) are dischargeable in chapter 9 bankruptcy. California’s
Eastern District Court came close to addressing the issue in V.W. v. City of
Vallejo, a case related to the city of Vallejo’s bankruptcy.99 There, the court
opined that municipal obligations to indemnify public employees arising preconfirmation were “arguably” dischargeable by the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization.100 However, the court declined to rule on dischargeability in
V.W., instead deciding the case on other grounds.101 The Ninth Circuit also noted
in Deocampo v. Potts that a municipality’s obligation to indemnify does not arise
under California law until it undertakes an employee’s defense.102 Because a
municipal plan of reorganization can only affect debts arising before plan
confirmation, the point at which state law or contract imposes an obligation will

95

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825.2(b).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a).
97
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825.2(b). See also Rivas v. City of Kerman, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147, 151—55 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting California municipalities’ obligations towards employees under Cal. Government
Code §§ 825 & 825.2 (2012)).
98
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(b), (f).
99
V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *21.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1145 (noting that, because Vallejo did not actually become obligated to certain
officers until after the plan confirmation date, their claims against the city for indemnification were not
discharged).
96
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set the baseline for its dischargeability.103 This uncertainty is only compounded
when municipal debtors attempt to leverage their indemnification commitments
to extend bankruptcy relief to public employees.
D. Third-Party Relief
Third-party relief originated in chapter 11 cases involving mass tort
claims.104 As a court-created solution never explicitly endorsed by the Supreme
Court, approaches to third-party relief remain fragmented by circuit.105 In the
last decade, courts have extended the doctrine to municipal bankruptcy cases,
while questioning the extent to which the limitations on third-party relief
imposed by chapter 11 case law are transferable to chapter 9.106
1. Third-Party Relief in Chapter 11
In a chapter 11 bankruptcy case, a debtor may ask the court to release claims
against related parties if doing so will help the debtor reorganize.107 This ability
can be an important bargaining chip, allowing debtors to induce “lenders, equity
investors, and other third parties” to provide necessary financing and “[agree] to
participate in [the] plan.”108 Bankruptcy courts have “related to” jurisdiction
over “suits between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy.”109
However, § 524(e) of the Code provides that “discharge of a debt of the debtor
does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other
entity for, such debt.”110 Circuit courts are currently split on whether § 524(e)
denies bankruptcy courts the authority to approve third-party relief under chapter

103
See 11 U.S.C. § 944(b) (2012). See also O’Loghlin v. County of Orange, 229 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that plaintiff’s ADA violation claims arising pre-confirmation were discharged, while an
identical claim arising post-confirmation from the same “series of violations” was not).
104
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 654–55.
105
See In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) prohibits third-party
relief); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (holding that § 524(e) does not prohibit third-party relief and
announcing a seven-factor standard); In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d at 214 (listing three “hallmarks of
permissible non-consensual releases”); Palmer et al., supra note 20, at 555–56.
106
See In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59–60 (distilling a new three-factor test based on necessity
to the municipality’s reorganization).
107
Palmer et al., supra note 20.
108
Id.
109
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 56–57 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307
n.6 (explaining the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012))); see also In re
Pacor, Inc., 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984) (proposing that a “civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy” if “the
outcome . . . could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.”).
110
11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012).
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11.111 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits hold that § 524(e) prohibits third-party relief
entirely.112 The other circuits, however, agree that § 524(e) only limits the scope
of a debtor’s bankruptcy discharge, and does not affect the bankruptcy court’s
power to order other relief in chapter 11.113 Bankruptcy courts in these circuits
use a variety of standards to determine whether “unusual circumstances” exist
that justify the “dramatic measure” of third-party relief.114
a. Dow Corning: Third-party Releases Allowable Under the Code
The seven factors the Ninth Circuit applied in In re Dow Corning are typical
of the majority standards. The Dow Corning factors considering whether:
(1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third
party, usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the
non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor . . . ; (2) The
non-debtor has contributed substantial assets to the reorganization; (3)
The injunction is essential to reorganization, namely, the
reorganization hinges on the debtor being free from indirect suits
against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims
against the debtor; (4) The impacted class . . . has overwhelmingly
voted to accept the plan; (5) The plan provides a mechanism to pay for
. . . the class . . . affected by the injunction; (6) The plan provides an
opportunity for those claimants who choose not to settle to recover in
full and; (7) The bankruptcy court made a record of specific factual
findings that support its conclusions.”115

Not all circuits require every factor to be present to justify third-party relief, and
there is no consensus regarding which factors are more or less important than
others.116

111
See, e.g., In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 52 (noting the circuit split); In re Lowenschuss, 67
F.3d at 1402 (holding that the specific rule in 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) “displace[d]” the bankruptcy courts’
general “equitable powers” granted by 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012), and listing consistent Ninth Circuit precedent);
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657–58 (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) only limits the scope of
the debtor’s discharge, not a court’s equitable authority to issue injunctions affecting third parties under 11
U.S.C. § 105 (2012)).
112
Palmer et al., supra note 20, at 555–56.
113
Id.
114
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (“[O]ur sister circuits have considered a number of factors,
which are summarized in our holding below.”).
115
Id.
116
Nat’l Heritage Found. v. Highbourne Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144 at *19 (4th Cir. 2014) (“A
debtor need not demonstrate that every Dow Corning factor weighs in its favor . . . [b]ut . . . a debtor must
provide adequate factual support to show that the circumstances warrant such exceptional relief[.]”).
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The facts of Dow Corning exemplify situations in which bankruptcy courts
may release claims against third parties to assist debtors’ reorganization
efforts.117 Faced with an unprecedented number of product liability suits, Dow
Corning’s shareholders and insurers established a $2.35 billion fund to pay the
company’s tort claimants.118 In return, Dow Corning’s plan of reorganization
released the company and its shareholders and insurers from all future
liability.119 Under the plan, claimants who decided not to settle could still litigate
separately.120
After articulating the Dow Corning factors, the Sixth Circuit remanded the
case to Michigan’s Eastern District Court for additional factfinding.121 On
remand, the district court found that all seven factors were met.122 First, Dow
Corning and its subsidiaries, shareholders, and insurers had identical interests—
avoiding product liability claims.123 The shareholders and insurers were also
contributing substantial assets via the settlement fund, without which Dow
Corning would be unable to satisfy future claims.124 Moreover, by the date of
the decision all affected classes of creditors eligible to vote on the plan had
approved it.125 Lastly, the plan’s settlement fund ensured that substantially all
affected classes would be paid, whether they chose to settle or litigate.126 The
district court accordingly ruled that Dow Corning’s proposed release complied
with the Code.127
b. National Heritage Foundation and Gillman: Third-Party Releases That
Fail to Conform with the Code
The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in National Heritage Foundation v.
Highbourne Foundation shows an application of the Dow Corning factors that

117
In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. 396, 416 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (approving the release of Dow Corning
stakeholders from liability for defective products).
118
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 653–54.
119
Id. at 654–55.
120
Id. at 655.
121
Id. at 658–59; In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 401 (noting that the bankruptcy judge recused
himself after the Sixth Circuit ruling, prompting the district court to pick up the case).
122
In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 416.
123
Id. at 402–04.
124
Id. at 404–13 (comprising the second and third Dow Corning factors).
125
Id. at 413–14.
126
Id. at 414–16.
127
In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 416. The seventh factor, “a record of specific factual findings,”
was satisfied by creating a record on the other six factors, so the court did not discuss it explicitly. In re Dow
Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 399.

MORBIDELLI COMMENT_PROOFS

242

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

1/14/2019 9:15 AM

[Vol. 35

led to the opposite conclusion.128 In National Heritage Foundation the debtor, a
non-profit organization, included a blanket release (the “plan release”) of its
directors and creditors (the “released parties”) from liability arising from the
debtor’s preconfirmation activity.129 The plan release was designed to prevent
large donors from suing the released parties for misusing donations.130 National
Heritage Foundation (NHF) argued that the plan release was necessary because
indemnifying the released parties would be prohibitively expensive, and without
indemnification it would be unable to find qualified directors.131
Although NHF’s indemnification commitments created an identity of
interests with the released parties, the circuit court ruled that continuing to work
for NHF did not constitute additional consideration for the plan release.132
Without additional consideration, the directors had not made “substantial
contribution[s]” to the reorganization.133 The court did not find the debtor’s
“necessity” argument convincing either, pointing out that NHF could simply
discharge its obligation to indemnify the current directors for pre-confirmation
acts, leaving its future commitment to indemnifying directors intact.134 The court
also refused to presume the impacted donors’ consent, because they did not have
an opportunity to vote on the plan.135 Lastly, the plan did not compensate the
donors at all or offer non-consenting donors an opportunity to recover.136
Reiterating its prior holdings that such releases should be used “cautiously and
infrequently,” the court found that the plan release was not appropriate under the
Dow Corning factors.137
Some circuits that do not explicitly follow Dow Corning nevertheless closely
track its principles.138 The Third Circuit, for instance, recognizes several
“hallmarks of permissible non-consensual releases” and imports reasoning from

128

Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *19.
Id at *3.
130
Id at *7–8.
131
Id at *9–13.
132
Id at *7–9.
133
Id. at *7–9.
134
Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *9–13.
135
Id. at *13–15.
136
Id. at *15–18.
137
Id. at *4 (citing Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., 663 F.3d 704, 712 (4th Cir. 2011)). See also
Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network Inc.), 416 F.3d 136,
142 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“No case has tolerated non-debtor releases absent the finding of circumstances that may be
characterized as unique.”).
138
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 658 (“[O]ur sister circuits have considered a number of factors,
which are summarized in our holding below.”).
129
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Dow Corning jurisdictions.139 In Gillman v. Continental Airlines, the circuit
court rejected a release enjoining shareholder class-action suits against
indemnified directors and officers of the debtor.140 The court’s rejection was
based on the release’s lack of “fairness, necessity to the reorganization, and
specific factual findings.”141 The plan was unfair to the class-action plaintiffs
because it did not offer them any consideration for giving up their claims.142 It
was unnecessary both because the directors and officers were not making any
financial contributions crucial to the plan’s feasibility, and because the expense
of indemnification was both highly contingent and insignificant relative to the
debtor’s other obligations.143
2. Third-Party Relief in Chapter 9
While courts developed standards for third-party relief in chapter 11
bankruptcy, very few municipalities were filing cases under chapter 9.144
Unsurprisingly, then, municipal requests for third-party relief only began to
appear after the recent recession and its corresponding wave of municipal
bankruptcies.145 Although the uses of third-party relief under both chapters share
many common characteristics, some courts have expressed reservations about
the applicability of their chapter 11 rules to chapter 9.146
a. Connector 2000: The Introduction of Third-Party Relief to Chapter 9
Bankruptcy
In re Connector 2000 was the first chapter 9 bankruptcy case to rule on thirdparty relief, and its reasoning has influenced subsequent rulings on the
subject.147 Connector 2000 was a non-profit corporation created to construct and
139

In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d at 214.
Id. at 216–18.
141
Id. at 214.
142
Id. at 215.
143
Id. at 215–17 (“we find it difficult to conceive that Plaintiffs’ lawsuits were anything more than a flea”).
144
From 1934 to 2012, when the recession-precipitated wave of municipal bankruptcies was already under
way, “only forty-nine cities, counties, and towns” had filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy, although about 600 specialpurpose entities had also done so. Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role
of State Choices, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 72 (2015). However, the number of cases resulting in published
opinions is likely much lower due to dismissals.
145
Bankrupt Cities, Municipalities List and Map, GOVERNING (Sep. 14, 2017), http://www.governing.
com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaults.html (noting that sixty-one municipalities
have filed for bankruptcy since 2010).
146
See In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59–60 (distilling a new three-factor test based on necessity
to the municipality’s reorganization).
147
See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173–76 (invoking Connector 2000 to enunciate a rule based
on the Dow Corning factors); Oppenheimer AMT-Free Municipals v. ACA Fin. Guar. Corp., 971 N.Y.S.2d 95,
140
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administer toll roads in conjunction with South Carolina’s Department of
Transportation (SCDOT).148 In 1998, Connector 2000 issued bonds to finance a
road near Greenville.149 After completion, however, the toll road failed to
generate sufficient revenue to service the bonds.150 This prompted Connector
2000 to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy in 2010.151
During the bankruptcy proceeding, bondholders alleged that they had causes
of action against SCDOT for failing to maintain appropriate toll rates on the
Greenville road, precipitating Connector 2000’s default.152 In return for
assuming the toll road’s maintenance and releasing its claims for licensing fees
against Connector 2000 (among other concessions), the plan of reorganization
proposed to release SCDOT from liability to the bondholders.153 The
bondholders, in turn, would receive smaller “Amended and Restated bonds” that
Connector 2000 could feasibly repay.154
The bankruptcy court did not decide whether the Dow Corning factors were
necessary for chapter 9 cases, but nevertheless discussed them briefly.155 The
court decided that the Dow Corning factors were satisfied because of the close
ties between Connector 2000 and SCDOT, the quid-pro-quo nature of the
release, and the fact that all affected classes had consented to the plan.156 It
excused the absence of an “opt-out” clause for bondholders by reasoning that
this factor had been intended for mass-tort situations, in which each party had a
cause of action arising from separate facts.157

99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (acknowledging the bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin claims against non-debtors,
although it had not done so).
148
In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011).
149
Id. (“$200,177,680 original principal amount”).
150
Id.
151
Id. Despite being a nonprofit corporation, Connector 2000 qualified as a municipality under chapter 9
because it was “subject to control by [a] public authority, state or municipal[ity]” In re Connector 2000 Ass’n,
447 B.R. at 758 (quoting Ex parte York Co. Natural Gas Auth., 238 F. Supp. 964, 976 (D.C.S.C. 1965)).
152
In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 766.
153
Id. at 766–67.
154
Id. at 766.
155
Id. at 767 (“The third party releases and injunctions contained in the Plan may be proper without regard
to the [Dow Corning factors] because § 901 does not incorporate § 524(e). However, even applying the factors
discussed above to this case, I find . . . that the third party releases . . . are appropriate and necessary”).
156
Id. at 768 (“First, . . . SCDOT owns the [toll road] and provides Debtor the right to operate the road . .
. . Second, SCDOT and the Bondholders are providing substantial consideration critical to effectuat[ing] the
Plan . . . . Third, the releases are necessary to support all the parties’ giving of such consideration . . . . Fourth,
all of the impacted classes of creditors overwhelmingly support and have voted in favor of the Plan. Fifth, the
Plan provides for the [impacted classes] to receive payment”).
157
In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768.
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Connector 2000 represents a consensual use of a third-party release in a
situation where the difference between the debtor (Connector 2000) and the third
party (SCDOT) was almost a technicality.158 The other parties to the release, the
bondholders, were also directly compensated by receiving new bonds.159 These
facts stand in stark contrast to the line of cases that followed, where proposed
releases would harm parties potentially unrelated to the bankruptcies and benefit
parties distinctly separate from the debtor.160
b. The Vallejo Cases: Lawsuits Against Indemnified Municipal
Employees Do Not Fall Within the Scope of a Municipality’s
Discharge
The issue of third-party relief in the context of chapter 9 surfaced again
recently during the city of Vallejo’s bankruptcy proceeding.161 While the case
was pending, police officer defendants in several civil rights lawsuits to which
the city was also a party162 requested (and some received)163 the protection of
Vallejo’s automatic stay. After the bankruptcy court confirmed the city’s plan
of reorganization in 2011, adjusting the civil rights claims against Vallejo, 164
the officers contended that the claims against them personally were likewise
discharged.165 They reasoned that, because the city would be obligated to
indemnify them under California law, the lawsuits were essentially against
Vallejo for bankruptcy purposes.166
158
In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 754 (“The Debtor was formed to assist the South Carolina
Department of Transportation (“SCDOT”) in the financing, acquisition, construction, and operation of turnpikes,
highway projects, and other transportation facilities.”).
159
Id. at 766.
160
See V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *10–11; Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1139; In re City of
Detroit, 524 B.R. at 263; In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50.
161
See generally Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1136–39 (outlining the course of Vallejo’s bankruptcy from
filing on May 23, 2008 to plan confirmation on August 4, 2011).
162
V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *1 (“This civil rights lawsuit . . . against the City of Vallejo .
. . and its Chief of Police . . . alleges that the City’s police officers killed the decedent while they were using a
taser gun during his arrest.”); Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1137 (“Plaintiffs asserted excessive-force and other
constitutional claims against the Officers.”).
163
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1136–39 (“the parties stipulated in writing that Vallejo’s bankruptcy filing
triggered an automatic stay”); but see V.W., 20133 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *22 (quoting Maddalone v.
Solano County, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2116 (E.D. Cal.) (“in the context of a request for a stay, claims against
employees of bankrupt city are not claims against the bankrupt city”)).
164
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1142 (citing Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1984); Ronwin v.
Shapiro, 657 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1981)) (“[A] claim against a City official is not essentially one against the City
for bankruptcy discharge purposes, even if state law requires the City to indemnify the official.”).
165
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1139; V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *10–11.
166
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1141 (citing CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 825(a), obligating a public entity “to
indemnify its employees for judgments against the employees based upon employee acts or omissions arising
within the scope of employment”); V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *10–11.
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In both cases, the district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected these
arguments, holding that the lawsuits were not against the city, and were therefore
not discharged in bankruptcy.167 The district court achieved this result in V.W.
by extending to bankruptcy the rule that a federal lawsuit against a state
employee “is not essentially one against the state” for purposes of sovereign
immunity.168 The court noted that Vallejo’s “indemnification obligation[s]
w[ere] arguably discharged by the bankruptcy.”169
The court also discussed an “alarming” result regarding indemnified
employees and the § 523(a)(6) exception to discharge.170 Bankruptcy courts
have often held that claims arising from injurious civil rights violations are nondischargeable “debts . . . for willful and malicious injury” in individual
bankruptcies.171 However, chapter 9 does not incorporate that exception, which
in any case applies only to individual debtors.172 Thus, shielding city employees
from liability using third-party releases would essentially circumvent federal
civil rights and bankruptcy laws.173 The court unfortunately declined to rule on
this issue.174
In Deocampo, the Ninth Circuit implicitly endorsed the V.W. court’s
reasoning. It began by establishing that, because chapter 9 does not incorporate
11 U.S.C. § 524(e),175 its holdings barring third-party relief under chapter 11 did
not necessarily translate to chapter 9.176 Even so, the court used the same rule as
V.W. to hold that the lawsuits were not claims against the city.177 Lastly, the
court examined Vallejo’s plan of reorganization and found that it lacked an
167

Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1136; V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *24.
V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *21.
169
Id.; but cf. Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1145 (noting that, because Vallejo did not actually become obligated
to the officers until after the plan confirmation date, their claims against the city for indemnification were not
discharged).
170
V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8–10 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012)).
171
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012) and its application in In re Gee, 173 B.R. at 193).
172
V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012), referencing chapters 7,
11, 12, and 13, but not chapter 9).
173
Id. (“This extraordinary result would appear to exalt the bankruptcy laws over the civil rights laws
(even though the civil rights laws, like the bankruptcy laws, are anchored in the constitution).”). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2012).
174
V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8–10.
175
11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012) (“discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other
entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.”); 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (“Applicability of other
sections of this title”).
176
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1143 (holding that its reasoning in In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1401
precluding third-party relief in chapter 11 “does not apply in Chapter 9 proceedings”).
177
Id. at 1142–43 (citing Demery, 735 F.2d at 1147 and holding that its analysis of “the attribution of
liability between public entities and their officers” in the context of sovereign immunity “is equally applicable”
to bankruptcy).
168

MORBIDELLI COMMENT_PROOFS

2019]

1/14/2019 9:15 AM

THIRD-PARTY RELIEF FOR MUNICIPAL DEBTORS

247

“express”178 release of the officers from liability, “supported by specific factual
findings.”179
c. Detroit: The Grand Bargain and Indemnified Police Officers
Detroit’s chapter 9 bankruptcy is the country’s largest to date.180 In its plan
of reorganization, the city proposed multiple third-party releases.181 It attempted
to release the claims that civil rights plaintiffs (the “§ 1983 creditors”) were
asserting against indemnified police officers, as in Vallejo.182 Detroit also asked
to release the state of Michigan from liability for claims relating to Detroit’s
endangered pension funds.183 The latter resembled Connector 2000 in that it was
part of a mostly-consensual deal that benefitted all parties, including those
whose claims would be impaired.184
Detroit pointed to Connector 2000 as proof that the Dow Corning factors
were inapplicable to chapter 9 bankruptcy.185 It relied on the opinion’s remark
that, if § 524(e) made the Dow Corning factors necessary, its absence in chapter
9 bankruptcy could make them unnecessary.186 The Detroit court immediately
rejected this argument without discussing the merits of the factors themselves,
reiterating the Sixth Circuit’s stance that § 524(e) has no implications for thirdparty relief.187 Accordingly, it evaluated each proposed release under the Dow
Corning factors.188

178

Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1144 (citing In re Applewood Chair Co., 203 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1144 (citing Behrmann, 663 F.3d at 712–13).
180
See generally Zoe Thomas, Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 INT’ FIN. L. REV. 17 (2015); Scott A. Krystiniak,
From Wreckage Comes Reason: How Detroit’s Chapter 9 Filing Helps Develop a Practicable and Principled
Good Faith Standard, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 235, 256–64 (2015).
181
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 172, 262–63.
182
Id. at 262–63 (summarizing “lawsuits seeking damages against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and
“against the City’s officers in their individual capacity.”).
183
Id. at 172 (“[E]ach holder of a pension claim releases the State and its related entities from all liabilities
arising from or related to the City, this case, PA 436, or article IX, § 24 of the Michigan constitution.”).
184
Id. at 174–75 (“[T]he release and injunction are essential to the reorganization of the City[,] . . . the
impacted classes have overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan[, and] . . . the plan provides a mechanism to pay
a substantial portion of the claims in the classes affected by the release.”).
185
Id. at 173 (citing In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 767 (“The third party releases and injunctions
contained in the Plan may be proper without regard to the [Dow Corning factors] because § 901 does not
incorporate § 524(e).”)).
186
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173 (citing In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 767 (“The third
party releases and injunctions contained in the Plan may be proper without regard to the [Dow Corning factors]
because § 901 does not incorporate § 524(e).”)).
187
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173 (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657).
188
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 172, 262–63.
179
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The pension plan release was a component of the “Grand Bargain” struck
between Michigan, Detroit, and Detroit’s claimholders to provide for the city’s
pensioners and save its extensive art collection.189 Some pensioners claimed that
Michigan’s constitution gave them a cause of action against the state for
deficiencies in their pension funds.190 In return for contributing almost $200
million to rescue the pension funds, Michigan asked to be formally released from
liability for any claims arising from the funds.191 This agreement, along with
significant philanthropic contributions made through the Detroit Institute of
Arts, made the Grand Bargain possible.192
Analogizing these facts to Connector 2000, the court quickly determined that
all Dow Corning factors except the “opt-out” provision were satisfied, and
approved the pension plan release.193 Although it nominally accepted Dow
Corning, the court also invoked Highbourne’s statement that “[a] debtor need
not demonstrate that every . . . factor weighs in its favor to obtain approval of a
non-debtor release” as authority to adapt the factors to chapter 9.194 Recognizing
the Dow Corning factors’ origins in mass-tort liability in business bankruptcies,
the court further noted that “[m]uch debate could be had regarding which of the
. . . factors should apply in a chapter 9 case and whether any other factors should
apply.”195 This uncertainty forms the basis for the relaxed standards applied later
in the opinion and in San Bernardino.196
As in the Vallejo cases, Detroit was obligated to indemnify its police officers
for damages awarded to civil rights plaintiffs. Here, however, the city’s
obligation stemmed from a contract it assumed under the plan of
189

Id. at 169–70.
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 170 (citing MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 24).
191
Id. at 169–70. The plan would also halt any ongoing litigation against Michigan on account of the
pension funds.
192
Id. For an overview of the Detroit Institute of Arts’ role in the Grand Bargain, see generally Collins,
supra note 50.
193
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174–75 (“First, . . . [t]he City is a political arm of the State . . . created
to further the objectives of the State . . . . Second, the State is contributing substantial assets to the reorganization
. . . . Third, the release and injunction are essential to the . . . Grand Bargain, which . . . is the cornerstone of the
City’s plan . . . . Fourth, the impacted classes have overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan . . . . Fifth, the plan
provides a mechanism to pay a substantial portion of the claims in the classes affected by the release[.] Finally,
. . . this opinion contains the specific findings of facts supporting the Court’s conclusion that the non-consensual
releases . . . are appropriate.”).
194
Id. at 174 (quoting Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *6).
195
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174.
196
See id. at 266 (holding Dow Corning’s fourth (“essential to reorganization”) factor alone to be
dispositive in rejecting a third-party release); In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58 (enunciating a
three-factor test based on Detroit, requiring a release to be express, integral to reorganization, and supported by
specific factual findings).
190
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reorganization197 instead of a statute. Detroit’s plan of reorganization also
specifically proposed to discharge the officers from individual liability, citing
“the effective and efficient functioning of the police department” as
consideration for the releases.198 Accordingly, upon the § 1983 creditors’
objection, Detroit “attempted to distinguish [V.W.] on the grounds that the
Vallejo plan did not include a discharge or release of claims against officers.”199
The court rejected Detroit’s argument using its modified Dow Corning
rule.200 The Dow Corning opinion stated that a “bankruptcy court’s power to
order a third-party release is based on its ‘power to reorder creditor-debtor
relations needed to achieve a successful reorganization.’”201 Thus, the Detroit
court went a step further and reasoned that the “necessity” factor alone could be
determinative.202 Finding that the city had not established that its proposed
release was “essential to the success of the City’s plan,” the court sustained the
§ 1983 creditors’ objection.203 In doing so, the court acknowledged that it was
“effectively creat[ing] a class of creditors that will be paid in full” but held that
this was a proper result.204 Because Detroit had voluntarily assumed the
underlying contract in its plan of reorganization, it was bound to comply with
the terms it had negotiated.205
d. San Bernardino: The Necessity Standard Emerges
San Bernardino’s bankruptcy, the most recent chapter 9 case to bring up
third-party relief, follows directly from Vallejo and Detroit. The city was
obligated to indemnify a group of police officer defendants against judgments
entered against them for civil rights violations.206 Like in Vallejo, the city’s
197

In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67.
Id. at 266 (“[T]he City responds that its plan properly seeks to release [the § 1983] claims.”).
199
Id. at 265–66.
200
Id. at 266 (adopting the third factor from the test for third-party relief used in In re Dow Corning Corp.,
280 F.3d 648).
201
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266 (emphasis added).
202
Id. at 266–67.
203
Id. (“Absent demonstrated necessity, the bankruptcy code does not allow the impairment and discharge
of unsecured claims against third parties . . . [t]herefore, the Court sustains the § 1983 creditors’ objections.”).
204
Id.
205
Id. (“[A] debtor’s assumption of an executory contract requires the debtor to comply with the contract
. . . and presumably the City entered into the contract and assumed it precisely because it concluded that it is
mission-justified.”).
206
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 49–50 (“Civil Rights Claimants who … asserted litigation
claims not only against the City but also against it employees acting in the normal course of their employment,
in particular members of the Police Department . . . . At the time of confirmation . . . , the City had approximately
115 lawsuits pending against it and more than 200 other Claimants who had . . . not yet initiated litigation. More
than half of the lawsuits and many of the other Claimants asserted claims against the Indemnified Parties.”).
198
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obligations arose from California law regarding public employee
indemnification,207 and similar to Detroit, the city reaffirmed its obligations in
the plan as a result of collective bargaining agreements it reached with
employees.208
San Bernardino, apparently learning from its predecessors, provided for an
injunction in its plan of reorganization (“the plan injunction”).209 The plan
injunction would “shield the City’s employees, specifically its police officers,
from litigation exposure and liability for damages of Claimants who alleged the
officers had violated their civil rights.”210 The plan injunction was expressly
featured211 and accompanied by specific factual findings that the city would not
be able to afford its proposed annual budgets without the plan injunction.212
These findings included the city’s unsuccessful attempts to eliminate its
operating deficit by “dramatically reduc[ing] expenses and work[ing] diligently
to increase revenues” and its decision to allocate “additional funds of $56.5
million over five years” to implement a “Police Resources Plan” targeting the
city’s high crime rates.213
The bankruptcy court agreed,214 first citing the Ninth Circuit in Deocampo
that third-party relief was not per se impermissible under chapter 9.215 The court
next combined the Deocampo and Detroit reasoning into a three-part test,
permitting third-party relief under chapter 9 if the injunction is: “(i) . . . express;
(ii) . . . an integral part of the reorganization; and (iii) . . . supported by specific
207
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50 (noting that CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825(a), among other state
statutes, obligates municipalities “to indemnify their employees for claims against them arising from the scope
of their employment, such indemnification to cover both the costs of defense and any damage award against the
employee”).
208
Id. at 51 (“The settlements the City negotiated with its employee unions and the operative collective
bargaining agreements required the City to reaffirm its obligation to indemnify the employees . . . in the Plan.”).
209
Id. at 49.
210
Id. at 50 (citing San Bernardino’s plan providing that “[e]ntities who have held, hold, or may hold PreConfirmation Date Claims shall be permanently enjoined from . . . commencing or continuing in any manner,
directly or indirectly, any suit, action or other proceeding of any kind against . . . any or all of the Indemnified
parties or any of their property . . .” and defining “litigation claims” to include “lawsuits against any of the
Indemnified Parties, whether filed prior to the Confirmation Date or on or after the Confirmation Date based on
acts, claims or omissions that occurred or arose prior to the Confirmation Date, as to which lawsuits the City . .
. becomes obligated to pay any judgment arising therefrom . . .”).
211
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59 (“the Plan Injunction was expressly set forth in the Plan .
. . as required by the [Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016(c)] applicable to third-party injunctions”).
212
Id. at 59–61.
213
Id. at 60–61; see also In re City of San Bernardino Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 778–79 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013)
(describing the city’s financial hardships leading up to its bankruptcy filing).
214
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59 (“[T]he first[,] . . . second[,] and third factors are . . .
satisfied.”).
215
Id. at 57–58 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1143; 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2012)).
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factual findings216 regarding [its necessity] to the City’s efficient and effective
functioning, to its revitalization, or to the success of the plan.”217
Using this standard, the court found that the plan injunction was express and
featured sufficient “specific factual findings.”218 The feasibility of the city’s
proposed annual budgets was also enough of a “necessity” to satisfy the second
and third factors’ substantive requirements.219 Additional facts favoring
confirmation included the city employees’ cooperation in negotiating collective
bargaining agreements and accepting reduced payouts on their claims, the plan’s
“narrow tailor[ing]” to “only” enjoin collection on the judgments, not the
lawsuits themselves, and an insurance settlement that would provide some
compensation for claimants with “catastrophic injuries.”220 The court concluded
hopefully that, with its plan injunction in place, San Bernardino could “turn
around its fiscal crisis, provide sufficient municipal services to its residents, and
make the streets safe for economic development and greater personal
prosperity.”221
II. ANALYSIS
The necessity-based standard for third-party relief that has developed in
recent chapter 9 cases is improper for two reasons. First, it opens a loophole for
parties related to municipal debtors to be relieved of otherwise nondischargeable debts, contravening congressional intent as embodied in the
Code’s exceptions to discharge. Second, it removes any objective limitations on
third-party relief by eliminating key Dow Corning factors and by ignoring the
difficulties of measuring necessity without a municipal liquidation option. The
Dow Corning factors already guide courts to approve third-party releases
consistent with the Code and offer the experience of over thirty years of case
law. Nevertheless, circumstances common to municipal bankruptcies may
suggest adjustments to certain factors, as the courts in Connector 2000 and
Detroit noted.222

216
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 58 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016 requiring “specific and
conspicuous language” for plan injunctions “against conduct not otherwise enjoined under the Code”).
217
Id. at 57–58 (citing In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266; Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1144–45).
218
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 59–60.
219
Id. at 56 (“The unrefuted evidence . . . shows that the City does not and will not have the funds necessary
to both pay the judgments against the City’s employees and invest in the Police Resources Plan, among other
things.”).
220
Id. at 61–62.
221
Id. at 63.
222
In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174.
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As an initial matter, the V.W. court speculated that Vallejo’s obligations to
indemnify its officers might themselves have been dischargeable in
bankruptcy.223 If so, similarly situated municipalities will have no case for a
third-party release’s necessity to begin with. As the Detroit court pointed out, a
debtor that voluntarily assumes indemnification obligations instead of
discharging them has only itself to blame for the financial consequences.224
Of course, a debtor could argue in the alternative that indemnification is
necessary for recruitment. San Bernardino, for instance, predicted that its police
department would be unable to hire or retain officers unless they were shielded
from liability.225 However, the court in Highbourne refuted this same argument
with respect to the company’s directors.226 It pointed out that discharging the
debtor’s existing obligations in bankruptcy did not affect its commitments going
forward.227 The reorganized debtor would retain its policy of indemnifying
directors, so future directors would still expect to be indemnified.228 In the same
way, California’s indemnification statute still applies to San Bernardino postbankruptcy, so police officers can count on being indemnified in the future.
Nevertheless, this Comment continues with the assumption that
indemnification obligations cannot readily be discharged except through thirdparty relief. This allows this Comment to address the arguments that parties have
and probably will continue to rely on, absent rulings that directly address the
treatment of statutory indemnification obligations in bankruptcy.
A. Granting Relief to Non-Debtors for Non-Dischargeable Debts is
Inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code
Although the court in V.W. worried that releasing officers from liability for
civil rights judgments was contrary to federal policy, none of the other chapter
9 opinions considered that the officers’ debts would not be dischargeable had
they filed for bankruptcy individually.229 This is not entirely surprising, as

223

V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *21.
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67 (“[A] debtor’s assumption of an executory contract requires
the debtor to comply with the contract . . . and presumably the City entered into the contract and assumed it
precisely because it concluded that it is mission-justified.”).
225
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 55–56.
226
Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *9–13.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8 (“This extraordinary result would appear to exalt the
bankruptcy laws over the civil rights laws (even though the civil rights laws, like the bankruptcy laws, are
anchored in the constitution).”).
224
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outside of chapter 9 no case appears to have addressed third-party releases of
nondischargeable debts. Chapter 9’s omission of the § 523(a) exceptions,
expanding the scope of a debtor’s discharge, also indicates that Congress
considered municipal rehabilitation to be paramount.230 However, there is no
indication that Congress intended for third-parties to share in this “superdischarge” merely by association with the debtor. The case law surrounding
§ 523(a) instead shows an intent to keep individuals who have incurred certain
kinds of debt from receiving the benefit of the bankruptcy discharge.
1. Third-Party Relief is Justified by the Code’s “Fresh Start” Policy
One of the bankruptcy system’s central goals is to provide the debtor—
whether an individual, a business entity, or a municipality—with the opportunity
to start over, unimpeded by the effects of its past financial mistakes.231 This idea,
commonly called the “fresh start,” underlies a history of Code provisions and
case law that favors dischargeability and construes provisions to benefit the
“honest but unfortunate” debtor.232 Thus, even though the Code makes no
mention of a bankruptcy court’s ability to release third-parties from debts, many
courts have interpreted § 105(a)’s broad grant of equitable power to encompass
such relief.233 But because courts are limited in exercising this power to carrying
out the Code’s provisions, § 105(a) does not give them free reign to release third
parties.234
When the debtor is an entity instead of an individual, many non-debtors may
also be burdened by obligations arising from their relationship with the debtor.
For instance, a corporation’s directors may face liability for misusing funds, or
a municipality’s police officers for injuries caused in the line of duty.235 All else
equal, the debtor would prefer to simply release its directors or officers from
liability so that they can continue to serve without the distraction of litigation.

230
See V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *8 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012), referencing chapters
7, 11, 12, and 13, but not chapter 9).
231
Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87 (“[I]n the same breath that we have invoked this fresh start policy, we
have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning
to the honest but unfortunate debtor.”) (internal quotations omitted).
232
Id.; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010)
(“[T]he exceptions should be . . . strictly construed against the objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the
debtor.”).
233
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 565.
234
11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 565.
235
See, e.g., Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144 (denying debtor non-profit
organization’s proposed release of its directors from potential liability for misusing donations).
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However, such a release may contravene the Code by treating the directors’ or
officers’ creditors unfairly, placing it outside the debtor’s reach.
To this end, courts have developed standards, such as the Dow Corning
factors, to limit third-party relief to situations in which it is instrumental to the
debtor’s fresh start and consistent with the Code’s provisions.236 Mass tort
claims against indemnified parties tend to fall here, because the number and
amounts of claims may be difficult to estimate, exposing the debtor to uncertain
obligations going forward.237 Although a debtor can discharge its duty to
indemnify, it may need the indemnified parties to contribute substantially to the
reorganization. If, for example, the debtor instead establishes a settlement fund
to pay the claims, releasing third parties from personal liability can secure their
cooperation without treating creditors unfairly. This result is desirable because
the debtor has a better chance of recovery, and allowable because it is consistent
with the Code.
2. The § 523(a) Exceptions Overrule the General Policy Favoring
Dischargeability
Congress has decided that individuals who incur debts through certain types
of “wrongful acts” cannot use laws enacted to help the “honest but unfortunate”
debtor to discharge those debts.238 Although courts construe these excepted
categories narrowly, they enforce the exceptions rigorously.239 For instance, the
Supreme Court found that a creditor who accused a debtor of fraud (excepted
under § 523(a)(2)(A)) but settled before trial could still show that the debt arose
from non-dischargeable conduct.240 And courts have repeatedly found that debts
arising from civil rights violations fall under the § 523(a)(6) exception for
injuries caused by “willful and malicious conduct.”241

236
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 565 (justifying its ruling under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)’s grant
of “power to take appropriate equitable measures needed to implement other sections of the Code.”).
237
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648 (granting debtor manufacturer’s request to release
parties from product liability as a “quid pro quo” for contributions to a settlement fund).
238
Radwan, supra note 28; Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87.
239
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010)
(“[T]he exceptions should be . . . strictly construed against the objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the
debtor.”).
240
Archer, 538 U.S. at 323 (holding that although a “settlement agreement and releases may have worked
a kind of novation, . . . that fact does not bar [the creditor] from showing that the settlement debt arose out of
false pretences [sic], a false representation, or actual fraud, and consequently is nondischargeable.”).
241
See, e.g., In re Gee, 173 B.R. at 193 (concerning sex discrimination); Avery v. Sotelo (In re Sotelo),
179 B.R. 214, 218 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995) (concerning sexual harassment); In re Moore, 1 B.R. 52, 54 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1979) (concerning racial discrimination).
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A bankruptcy court cannot use its equitable powers in ways that are contrary
to the Code’s provisions, and the Code indicates a clear policy that certain debts
should not be discharged.242 Although § 523(a)’s exceptions only explicitly
apply to debtors, the Code only contemplates releasing debtors from debts in the
first place. Without a provision granting bankruptcy courts the ability to release
third parties from debts, there would be no reason to include language limiting
that ability. Courts already agree that the Code’s silence on third-party relief
does not grant them free reign to use it—hence the Dow Corning-based
standards. Requiring debtors’ requests for third-party relief to follow some of
the Code’s relevant requirements but not others is inconsistent and vulnerable to
abuse.
Through this limited application of the restrictions on dischargeability,
recent cases have suggested a loophole through which nondischargeable debts—
here arising from civil-rights violations—may be indirectly discharged.243
Although these cases are brought under chapter 9, the reasoning is equally
applicable in any chapter of the Code. For example, a business owner who faces
liability for obtaining money through fraud (excepted by § 523(a)(2)), could not
discharge that liability by filing for bankruptcy as an individual.244 However, the
same person could direct his or her business to file for bankruptcy under chapter
11, and include a release of the same liability in its plan of reorganization. Of
course, this plan would only work in circuits that allow third-party relief, and it
would need to satisfy the requirements of the circuit in which the business is
located. Nevertheless, it opens a possible end-run around the policies built into
the Code. While the beneficiaries of such releases are not technically “debtors”,
they are receiving the benefits of the bankruptcy discharge for debts which
Congress has explicitly excepted from discharge.245 Because the court’s
equitable powers are limited by the Code, and releasing nondischargeable debts
is contrary to its provisions, bankruptcy courts’ equitable powers do not extend
to releasing non-debtors from debts excepted by § 523(a).

242
A bankruptcy court’s powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012) are limited to enforcing the Code’s
provisions. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 565. On non-dischargeable debts, see Grogan, 498 U.S.
at 287; Radwan, supra note 28.
243
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1143; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67; In re City of San Bernardino,
566 B.R. at 56.
244
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2018) (applying to discharges obtained under chapters 7 and 13).
245
Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287.
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B. The Necessity Standard is Inappropriate for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
Third-party relief is not limited to the areas of products liability and insider
indemnification in chapter 11 cases, and municipal debtors will likewise find
many uses for it under chapter 9.246 The releases involving state liability to
municipal creditors, as in Connector 2000 and the pension fund release in
Detroit, have been consensual and mutually-beneficial.247 Accordingly, both
releases easily satisfied the Dow Corning factors.
On the other hand, the releases of municipal employees have been
constructed primarily to benefit those employees, at the expense of parties
potentially unrelated to the bankruptcy.248 After Detroit and San Bernardino, the
precedent concerning this second category conditions relief on its “necessity” to
the reorganization.249 While a municipality’s request for third-party relief must
also be clearly displayed in its proposed plan of reorganization and accompanied
by “specific factual findings” of necessity, these requirements are merely
procedural and do not rely on the debtor’s underlying situation.250
This “necessity” standard is problematic because it is neither consistent with
prior case law nor specifically adapted to the needs of municipal debtors.
Necessity, in particular, lacks teeth when the municipality cannot face
dissolution.251 This uncertainty encourages municipal debtors to over rely on
third-party releases, once reserved for unusual circumstances, instead of
addressing their own obligations.

246
See In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. 752 (approving consensual plan releasing state Department
of Transportation from claims of municipal debtor’s bondholders).
247
Id. at 768; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174–75.
248
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1139; V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *10–11; In re City of Detroit,
524 B.R. at 263; In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 50.
249
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67; In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58; Deocampo,
836 F.3d at 1144–45.
250
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266–67; In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58; Deocampo,
836 F.3d at 1144–45.
251
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld municipal debt adjustment legislation . . . at least in part on the premise that
the legislation involves no possibility of . . . liquidation of [a municipality’s] assets.”); In re Richmond Unified
School Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (1991) (“A municipal unit cannot liquidate its assets to satisfy its creditors[.]
. . . Therefore, the primary purpose of Chapter 9 is to allow [it] to continue operating while it adjusts or refinances
its creditor[s’] claims”).
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1. Third-Party Relief is a Dramatic Measure Reserved for Unusual
Circumstances
Chapter 9, like other chapters of the Code, centers around adjusting a
debtor’s obligations to its creditors.252 The Code provides bankruptcy courts
with various tools that can accomplish this, including the authority to use
equitable remedies (such as temporary and permanent injunctions) under
§ 105(a).253 However, “[s]ection 105 is not an independent source of
jurisdiction,” and must be exercised subject to the Code’s provisions254 and the
other limits on equitable remedies.255 Furthermore, equitable doctrines
traditionally restrict the use of injunctions to extraordinary situations where
there is “no adequate remedy at law.”256 Courts on both sides of the circuit split
have acknowledged that this doctrine influences third-party relief in bankruptcy,
rendering it a “dramatic measure” reserved for “unusual circumstances.”257
Early in its opinion, the Detroit court rejected the argument that, because
chapter 9 does not incorporate § 524(e), the Dow Corning factors were
irrelevant.258 It noted that, under Sixth Circuit law, § 524(e) only limited the
scope of the debtor’s discharge.259 Releasing third parties from debts did not
expand the debtor’s own discharge, so § 524(e) was never an obstacle to thirdparty relief.260 Accordingly, the court held that Dow Corning applied equally to
chapters 9 and 11.261 Acknowledging that individual factors could hold different
relevance in chapter 9, and aided by the example of Connector 2000, it found

252
In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 649 (“The general policy considerations underlying
. . . chapter 9 are the same as [those] of chapter 11 reorganization: to give the debtor a breathing spell from debt
collection efforts and establish a repayment plan with creditors.”).
253
11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”).
254
Celotex Corp., 514 U.S. at 327 (citing 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[1] (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) (“Section 105 is not an independent source of jurisdiction, but rather it
grants the courts flexibility to issue orders which preserve and protect their jurisdiction”)); Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (“whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts
must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
255
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.03[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010)
(“Statutes Affecting the Availability of Injunctive Relief”).
256
Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 530, 550 (2016).
257
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3 at 658; In re American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d 621, 626–27
(9th Cir. 1989).
258
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173 (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648).
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
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the plan injunction’s lack of necessity to be dispositive.262 Detroit, therefore,
should not be read to introduce a new standard for third-party relief.
The Detroit court’s holding is relevant to this analysis for two additional
reasons. First, it shows that third-party relief remains a “dramatic measure”
reserved for “unusual circumstances” in chapter 9, as it is in chapter 11.263
Second, the court points out that the Dow Corning factors are not the only
considerations limiting third-party relief—the Code’s plan confirmation
requirements, namely “good faith” proposal of and “fair and equitable”
treatment under a plan, always apply.264
However, although the San Bernardino court purported to follow the
reasoning in Detroit, it did not consider the applicability of the other Dow
Corning factors.265 Instead, it interpreted the single factor that proved sufficient
to reject a request for third-party release in Detroit as the sole substantive
requirement.266 This new standard constitutes a break from precedent without
any reasoning supporting its particular applicability to chapter 9 bankruptcy or
limitations reserving third-party relief for unusual circumstance.
2. The Necessity Standard Imposes no Substantive Limitations on the
Availability of Third-Party Relief
The indissolubility of municipalities means that no chapter 9 plan is
“necessary” in the chapter 11 sense—that is, the municipality will continue to
function until the state dissolves it, regardless of what happens in bankruptcy.267
This leaves the bankruptcy court without an objective measure of necessity,
forcing it to base its decision upon some other criterion. For instance, the San
Bernardino court substituted the feasibility of the city’s proposed budget.268
262

In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173 (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648).
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658.
264
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 173.
265
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58. The court inadvertently incorporated the seventh Dow
Corning factor, the procedural requirement that findings be supported by findings of fact, from Deocampo, 836
F.3d at 1144 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016). See In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648.
266
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58.
267
See In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 649 (quoting “[N]either Congress nor the
courts can change the existing system of government in this country . . . . One of the powers reserved to the
states is the power to create and govern municipalities.”); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[1] (Alan N.
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld municipal debt adjustment
legislation . . . at least in part on the premise that the legislation involves no possibility of . . . liquidation of [a
municipality’s] assets.”).
268
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 56 (“The unrefuted evidence . . . shows that the City does not
and will not have the funds necessary to both pay the judgments against the City’s employees and invest in the
Police Resources Plan, among other things.”).
263
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That measure is problematic because it does not need to reflect anything about
the municipality’s underlying financial situation.
Any budget can presumably allocate the entirety of a municipality’s
expected income for purposes other than indemnification. And if the budget
leaves no room for indemnification, indemnifying employees will jeopardize its
success. Under the San Bernardino court’s formulation, this almost-tautological
relation, combined with factual findings about the municipality’s dire financial
straits, could be sufficient to secure releases for the debtor’s employees, and
deny compensation to victims of civil rights violations. The lack of an objective
measure of necessity therefore transforms the necessity standard into an exercise
in budget drafting.
In other words, the debtor has a conflict of interests. The bankruptcy court
may have an idea of the municipality’s future earning potential but relies on the
municipality to accurately project its “necessary” expenses. The possibility of
pushing some costs onto third parties (in this case by leaving civil rights
plaintiffs uncompensated) creates a “use-it-or-lose-it” budgeting problem.269 If
the debtor doesn’t ask for third-party relief, it will be effectively shrinking its
own budget. In similar circumstances involving conflicts of interests, courts
have avoided interpreting Code provisions in ways that allow debtors to control
the narrative. For example, courts in many circuits prevent debtors from
gerrymandering classes of creditors in chapter 11 to meet the Code’s consent
requirements.270 This policy is based on judicial recognition that debtors have
an incentive to act in ways that are inconsistent with fundamental bankruptcy
principles, rather than any particular Code provision.271
When the availability of third-party relief depends primarily on the story a
debtor can tell, failing to request it is like leaving money on the table. Future
municipal debtors thus have every incentive to emulate the San Bernardino plan.
And they would appear to be eligible if they can produce budgets disposing of
all projected revenues, explicit requests for third-party relief, and factual

269
See generally Jeffrey B. Liebman & Neale Mahoney, Do Expiring Budgets Lead to Wasteful Year-End
Spending? Evidence from Federal Procurement 1 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
19481, September 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19481.pdf.
270
Russell M. Blain & Daniel R. Fogarty, Paths and Obstacles to Chapter 11 Confirmation: Artificial
Impairment, Gerrymandering, and Section 1111(b) 16 (Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Center Seminar, 2014),
available
at
http://www.sbli-inc.org/archive/2014/documents/Paths_and_Obstacles_to_Chapter_11_
Confirmation_etc.pdf.
271
Id.
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findings about the crucial roles of the indemnified employees.272 All are
procedural limitations that a debtor may be able to satisfy regardless of its
underlying need. In practice, the necessity standard would impose no substantive
limitations on many municipal debtors.
3. The Necessity Standard Fails to Reserve Third-Party Relief for Unusual
Circumstances
The ubiquity of police indemnification alone suggests that many future
municipal debtors will follow Detroit’s and San Bernardino’s leads.273
However, third-party relief is by no means limited to indemnified police officers.
Any indebted public employee who is making ongoing, substantial contributions
to a city’s operation by virtue of his or her employment is eligible for the same
treatment. In an extreme case, indebted officials could even send their own
municipal employer into an unnecessary bankruptcy proceeding solely to free
themselves or their businesses from nondischargeable debts, or to save
themselves the embarrassment of declaring bankruptcy individually.
These examples suggest a few of the countless situations in which a debtor
municipality can (and has every incentive to) request third-party relief.
Assuming its plan of reorganization satisfies the procedural requirements, the
necessity standard gives no reason to deny these requests. The fundamental
objection to the necessity standard, then, is that it does not limit third-party relief
to unusual circumstances. This subverts the roles of both bankruptcy, as a forum
for adjusting the relations between the “honest but unfortunate” debtor and its
creditors,274 and equitable remedies, as extreme solutions to problems for which
the law does not adequately provide.275 If bankruptcy courts wish to limit thirdparty relief in accordance with bankruptcy and equitable principles, they must
look to something other than the necessity standard.

272
In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58 (citing In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266;
Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1144–45).
273
See Schwartz, supra note 30 (revealing results of a nationwide study indicated that “police officers are
virtually always indemnified,” although often by unofficial arrangements).
274
In re Addison Community Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. at 649 (“The general policy considerations underlying
. . . chapter 9 are the same as [those] of chapter 11 reorganization: to give the debtor a breathing spell from debt
collection efforts and establish a repayment plan with creditors.”); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87.
275
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (internal quotations omitted) (“Because such an
injunction is a dramatic measure to be used cautiously, . . . enjoining a non-consenting creditor’s claim is only
appropriate in unusual circumstances.”).
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C. An Appropriate Standard for Third-party Relief in Chapter 9 Must
Impose Substantive Limitations
The Code restricts the dischargeability of certain debts, and equitable
doctrines limit a court’s ability to approve creative solutions to a debtor’s
financial woes. In the realm of third-party relief, standards such as the Dow
Corning factors help to ensure that plans of reorganization conform with both
legal and equitable principles. Recently, courts have questioned the suitability
of Dow Corning for chapter 9 bankruptcies. The alternative that has emerged—
the necessity standard—fails to restrict third-party relief in accordance with the
Code. This section explains why the Dow Corning factors remain applicable. It
also considers legislative options for removing the uncertainty surrounding
third-party relief and protecting indemnified public employees.
1. The Dow Corning Factors
The seven Dow Corning factors consider whether (1) “[t]here is an identity
of interests” between the debtor and non-debtor, (2) “[t]he non-debtor has
contributed substantial assets,” (3) the release “is essential to reorganization,”
(4) the impacted class has accepted the plan, (5) the plan would pay the impacted
class, as well as (6) allow objecting claimants to opt out, and (7) the bankruptcy
court has made “a record of specific factual findings.”276 All of these factors
remain relevant to chapter 9 bankruptcy, including the sixth, which has received
the most criticism.277
As an initial matter, the seventh factor (a “record of specific factual
findings”) is required by Bankruptcy Rule 3016 for plan injunctions “against
conduct not otherwise enjoined under the Code.”278 The merits of a factual
record have not been questioned in any case involving third-party relief. Far
from it, courts following Dow Corning have specifically noted its practical
importance in the event of an appeal.279
The first Dow Corning factor, the existence of “an identity of interests
between the debtor and the third party,” is a source of the bankruptcy court’s
authority to release claims against third-parties.280 The effect of plan
confirmation in chapter 11 is to bind the debtor, its owners, and its creditors to

276
277
278
279
280

In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658..
In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174–75.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016.
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 653 (remanding due to lack of specific factual findings).
Id. at 658.
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the plan’s terms.281 The Code defines a creditor as an “entity that has a claim
against the debtor,” and a debtor as an entity “concerning which a case under
this title has been commenced.”282 Thus, unless a claim is essentially against the
debtor, the claimholder is not a “creditor,” and a plan of reorganization is not
binding with respect to that claim.283
Although the effect of plan confirmation in chapter 9 is also to bind the
“debtor and any creditors” to its terms, the inapplicability of § 524(e)
complicates the picture.284 The result, however, is the same. Assuming
§ 524(e)’s omission is not superfluous suggests that in some instances
discharging a municipality’s debt can also affect a non-debtor’s liability.
However, a court applying this interpretation must nevertheless find that a debt
is the municipality’s debt in the first place.285 This leaves the task of determining
which debts are the municipality’s. The court could either take a literal approach
or consider, as the Dow Corning court did, debts that are nominally against nondebtors but essentially against the municipality.286 Either way, the result will be
at least as restrictive as the first Dow Corning factor.
The fourth and fifth Dow Corning factors would remain relevant to
municipal bankruptcy if only because chapter 9 provides few other safeguards
of non-debtors’ rights.287 The factors require some combination of impacted
parties’ consent to their treatment under a plan of reorganization, and
compensation for giving up their claims.288 The Code requires a municipality’s
plan to be in its creditors’ best interests, meaning that its treatment is preferable
to their non-bankruptcy options.289 Although the parties affected by third-party
releases need not be creditors, the first Dow Corning factor and the situations in
which such releases arise generally ensure that this will be the case.290

281

11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (2018).
11 U.S.C. § 101(10), (13) (2018).
283
See, e.g., Deocampo, 836 F.3d at 1136; V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *24.
284
11 U.S.C. § 944(a) (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2018) (“[D]ischarge of a debt of the debtor does not
affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.”).
285
11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2018).
286
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (“There is an identity of interests between the debtor and
the third party, usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit
against the debtor.”).
287
See Tyson, supra note 34.
288
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658.
289
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.01[7][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010);
see Pryor, supra note 47 (discussing municipal creditors’ remedies outside of bankruptcy).
290
See In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (“There is an identity of interests between the debtor
and the third party, usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit
against the debtor.”). See, e.g., In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 766 (bondholders with claims against
282
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With respect to claims against a municipality directly, almost anything is
better than the creditors’ nonbankruptcy options, because creditors cannot
usually force a municipality to liquidate or raise additional revenue.291 However,
an indemnified third party—such as a municipal employee—does not receive
the same protections.292 With respect to its own creditors, an indemnified party
is no different than any other debtor. Creditors can obtain judgment liens on its
assets, garnish its wages, and possibly force it into bankruptcy. Parties impacted
by a third-party release are giving up real rights to payment and must be
compensated accordingly. Otherwise, the plan is not in their best interests. Thus,
the fourth and fifth Dow Corning factors remain a meaningful measure of plan
confirmability in chapter 9 bankruptcy.293
The courts in both Connector 2000 and Detroit noted that the sixth (opt-out)
factor may be of limited usefulness in municipal bankruptcy.294 This position
appears to be based on the bankruptcy policy that a creditor has no right to select
which of two equal sources of payment will satisfy its claim.295 In the context of
mass product liability suits where third-party relief originated, each injured
party’s claim could be based on entirely different circumstances and harms.296
Those differences could result in vastly different damage judgments if the claims
were litigated instead of settled. Thus, because some plaintiffs could recover
much more (or less) by litigating, forcing all of them into the same settlement
would not be the equivalent of choosing between equal sources of repayment.
With § 1983 civil rights claims, however, the opt-out factor finds new
relevance for chapter 9 bankruptcies. As with products liability claims, the facts
and injuries are specific to each plaintiff, with damage awards varying
accordingly.297 A bankruptcy court, then, cannot rely upon its authority to direct

both debtor and state); In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 170 (pensioners with claims against both debtor and
state).
291
See Parker, 590 F.2d at 653 (noting the “well-understood and established” principle “that it is contrary
to public policy to allow private liens on public property”); In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 215 (citing Faitoute
Iron & Steel Co., 316 U.S. at 510).
292
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title . . . only if such
entity . . . is a municipality.”).
293
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658; 11 U.S.C. § 943(7) (2018).
294
In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768; In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 174–75.
295
See In re A.H. Robbins Co., 880 F.2d at 701 (“A creditor has no right to choose which of two funds
will pay his claim. The bankruptcy court has the power to order a creditor who has two funds to satisfy his debt
to resort to the fund that will not defeat other creditors.”).
296
See In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. at 768.
297
Schwartz, supra note 30, at 892 (citing City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“like
other tort causes of action, it is designed to provide compensation for injuries arising from the violation of legal
duties, and thereby, of course, to deter future violations.”)).
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creditors between equal sources of repayment when it forces civil rights
plaintiffs to accept the same payout (or lack thereof). As in chapter 11 cases, it
must either insist that civil rights claimants have the ability to opt out of a thirdparty release or find a different source of authority for mandating equal
treatment.
Dow Corning’s second and third factors consider whether the non-debtor has
contributed substantial assets and whether protecting the debtor from indirect
liability is essential to the reorganization.298 They reflect that a bankruptcy
court’s equitable power is based on a remedy’s necessity to carrying out the
Code’s provisions.299 This suggests that the factors are interchangeable to some
degree—indeed, courts have considered releases justified primarily by either
one.300 Regardless, § 105(a), the Code provision granting courts necessity-based
equitable powers, applies to both chapters 9 and 11 equally.301
The “necessity” standard’s single substantive factor is like Dow Corning’s
second and third factors.302 However, as this Comment has argued, it must
instead measure necessity against something other than the municipality’s
ability to continue operating, such as its proposed budget. This narrower
characterization completely misses the point of necessity: determining whether
a release falls within the court’s equitable powers under § 105(a).303 Because
municipalities cannot face failure in the same way as businesses, this
determination will remain difficult and highly subjective in chapter 9
bankruptcies. However, basing third party relief on a municipality’s budgeting
skill does not justify a court’s use of its equitable power either.

298

In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658.
See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018).
300
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 287 B.R. at 404–13 (release intended to secure on non-debtor
contributions to reorganization); Nat’l Heritage Found., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12144, at *9–13 (release
intended to shield debtor from indemnification expenses).
301
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 103(a), (f) (2018) (applying chapter 1 to chapters 11 and 9,
respectively).
302
Compare In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. at 57–58 (considering “the necessity of the injunction
to the City’s efficient and effective functioning, to its revitalization, or to the success of the plan.”), with In re
Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 658 (“Whether . . . [t]he non-debtor has contributed substantial assets to the
reorganization [and whether the] injunction is essential to reorganization, namely, the reorganization hinges on
the debtor being free from indirect suits against parties who would have indemnity or contribution claims against
the debtor.”).
303
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018). See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 266.
299
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2. Legislative Alternatives
Congress ultimately determines whether and in what circumstances
bankruptcy courts should grant relief to third parties. Its policies as they are
currently expressed in the Code speak against granting third-party relief for
nondischargeable debts. But because so few bankruptcy cases have been brought
under chapter 9, many of its provisions are still unexplored and open for
interpretation. Doctrines developed elsewhere but not prohibited by the Code or
chapter 9, like third-party relief, will become better fitted to municipalities’
needs as new cases arise. Considering that Congress has tolerated conflicting
standards for third-party relief in chapter 11 for several decades, there is no
reason to expect that it will amend the Code to provide a definite standard for
chapter 9 any time soon.
However, state legislatures have every incentive to proactively address the
plight of public servants in bankruptcy. The widespread indemnification of
police officers suggests that the public values both compensating victims of civil
rights violations and encouraging officers to zealously enforce the law. State
governments can support these values without interposing their sovereign
immunity by, for example, assuming insolvent municipalities’ obligations to
indemnify employees.304 This solution would resemble Detroit’s Grand Bargain,
where Michigan rescued underfunded pension funds. The consideration given to
parties whose rights are affected would make any such plan more likely to satisfy
the Dow Corning factors.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 9 was a relatively quiet corner of bankruptcy law until the wave of
filings precipitated by the last recession gave it a national spotlight. Likewise,
third-party relief in municipal bankruptcy has risen from a hypothetical to a
highly desirable option due to widespread public employee indemnification. The
first cases to address third-party relief raised the possibility that it will be
generally available to municipal debtors as a means of discharging their
employees’ otherwise non-dischargeable debts. The lack of an objective
measure of necessity or other limiting factors gives the “necessity” standard
more bark than bite, ignoring third-party relief’s role as a “dramatic measure.”
This incentivizes municipalities to leave the less-palatable solutions of adjusting

304
Sovereign immunity extends to states and entities acting as “arms of the state.” Northern Ins. Co., 547
U.S. at 193. However, a suit against an indemnified employee is not a suit against a state for purposes of
sovereign immunity. V.W., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109145, at *21.
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their own future spending or indemnification obligations untouched, leading to
results at odds with bankruptcy policy. The discharge of debts excepted under
§ 523(a) is also problematic because it is at odds with congressional policy as
expressed in the Bankruptcy Code. Regularly approving third-party releases of
these debts would carve out a wide exception to § 523(a) that Congress has
shown no intention of creating.
An appropriate standard for chapter 9 should include substantive limitations
on the availability of third-party relief. A categorical ban would accomplish this
but would also narrow the scope of discharge beyond what the Code demands,
denying some debtors a useful remedy. The seven Dow Corning factors, on the
other hand, provide an appropriate balance and have the advantage of already
being accepted by most jurisdictions in the chapter 11 context. The existing case
law also provides precedent on releasing corporate officers and directors from
liability that can guide analogous municipal plan provisions. Ideally, a standard
for third-party relief would point bankruptcy courts to truly unusual
circumstances for municipal debtors and encourage municipalities to explore
every option for resolving their own obligations directly before turning to those
of third parties.
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